Giulia Fanti

Recently, researchers have demonstrated deanonymization attacks that exploit weaknesses in the Bitcoin network's peer-to-peer (P2P) networking protocols. In particular, the P2P network currently forwards content in a structured way that allows observers to link users' Bitcoin addresses to their IP addresses. This is a substantial privacy vulnerability that extends to several other cryptocurrencies as well. In this talk, I will discuss how these attacks work, and how effective they are at deanonymizing users. I will also talk about countermeasures, including proposed modifications to the networking stack. 

References
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An analysis of anonymity in Bitcoin using P2P traffic by Philip Koshy, Diana Koshy, and Patrick McDaniel; FC 2014 (https://www.ifca.ai/fc14/papers/fc14_submission_71.pdf)

Deanonymisation of clients in Bitcoin P2P network by Alex Biryukov, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Ivan Pustogarov; CCS 2014 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.7418)

Dandelion: Redesigning the bitcoin network for anonymity by Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan, Giulia Fanti, and Pramod Viswanath; Sigmetrics 2017 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1701.04439)

Anonymity properties of the Bitcoin P2P network by Giulia Fanti and Pramod Viswanath; NeurIPS 2017 (https://arxiv.org/pdf/1703.08761.pdf)